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HULL, 
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Appeal No. 20479 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The action was commenced by the plaintiffs against the 
defendants on March 26, 1974. (R.5-16). The plaintiffs were 
either stockholders of the defendant, Shelley Irrigation 
Development Corporation or were investors in said corporation. 
(Complaint, para. 1 & 2, R.6). Based upon the conduct of the 
defendants, the plaintiff sought an accounting of the corporate 
funds, the appointment of a receiver, an injunction restraining 
the transfer of corporate property and a redistribution of the 
stock on a fair and equitable basis. (R.5--16). Thereafter, the 
defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim on September 11, 
1974, alleging that the plaintiffs had unjustifiably interfered 
in the business of the defendant and that the defendant corpora-
tion was thereby damaged. (R.89-102). 
The case was at issue for an extremely long period of time 
and based upon the inactivity, Judge J. Robert Bullock, upon the 
filing of a Motion to Dismiss by the plaintiffs, dismissed the 
action with prejudice based upon Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R.351-352). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Complaint was filed on March 26, 19J34 on behalf of 
the plaintiffs requesting that the court impose an immediate 
receivership, require the defendants to maike an accounting of 
the monies invested by the plaintiff and further, to reapportion 
the stock based upon the inequities between the plaintiffs and 
the defendants. (R.5-16). 
2. Based upon the pleadings showing that the defendant, 
Shelley Irrigation Development, Inc. was facing imminent fore-
closure by the Small Business Administration of the United States 
2 
Government and therefore, all of the assets of the corporation 
and monies invested by the plaintiffs were in peril, the Court 
ordered Sidney A. Gilbert as a receiver of all business property 
of the defendants. Under the terms of the Order, Mr. Gilbert was 
allowed to take immediate possession of the business property and 
manage the same and was further charged with the responsibility 
of determining the status of the corporation. (R.16-20). 
3. The Hearing on the Order to Show Cause and Restraining 
Order which counsel for the plaintiff had signed by Judge Bullock 
was continued to May 3, ^ 984,^by the defendants first counsel in 
the case, John Pappas. (R.60-61). 
4. One day prior to the hearing of the Order to Show 
Cause, the plaintiffs and the defendants acting through their 
second attorney in the matter, A. M. Ferro, stipulated that the 
Court could issue its Order confirming the appointment of the 
receiver and that the receivership would continue subject to 
further Order of the Court. (R.70-71). 
5. After the Order memorializing the stipulation of the 
7 
parties was signed by Judge Bullock on May 17, 19^4, (R.73-75), 
no further action was taken until July, 1974. 
6. On July 12, 1974, the defendants, through their third 
set of attorneys, Orrin Hatch and Lowell Summerhays, filed a 
Motion to Dissolve the Receivership (R.76-80). On July 26, 1974, 
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Judge Maurice Harding dismissed the Motion filed by the 
defendants. (R.81). 
7. On September 13, 1974, Orrin G. Hatch on behalf of the 
defendants filed his second Motion to Dissolve the Receivership. 
(R.82). The plaintiffs in response prepared and had signed by 
Judge Allen B. Sorensen an Order To Show Cause addressed to the 
defendants requiring them to appear before the Court on September 
18, 1984, and to show cause why all of the assets of the corpora-
tion should not be turned over to the appointed receiver, Sidney 
Gilbert* (R.84-88). 
8. On September 11, 1974, the defendants, through their 
attorney, Orrin G. Hatch, filed an Answer and Counterclaim. 
(R.89-103). 
9. On September 18, 1984, the plaintiffs1 Order to Show 
Cause requesting the Court to require the defendants to turn 
over all of the assets of the corporation to the receiver and 
the defendants1 Motion to Dissolve the Receivership came on for 
hearing. The parties were able to stipulate to the issues which 
agreement is evidenced by a transcript of the Stipulations 
stated to the Court (R. 109-117), and by an Order* drafted by 
plaintiffs' counsel (R.119-121). Under the terms of *the Order 
the receivership was dissolved and the defendants were allowed 
two months beginning September 19, 1974, in which to attempt to 
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raise $350,000• The $350,000 was contemplated to be enough money 
to bring the Small Business Administration current, to pay off 
all outstanding creditors that were in default and to pay off all 
of the plaintiffs for money they had invested in the corporation. 
The Order further provided that if the defendants were unable to 
raise the money within two months, Mr. Sidney A. Gilbert would 
be re-appointed as the receiver with full authority to conduct 
the operations of the defendants' business. 
10. On June 18, 1975, a Motion and Order to Show Cause was 
prepared by plaintiffs' counsel requesting the Court to find the 
defendants in contempt of court inasmuch as they had failed to 
abide by the terms of the previous Order dated September 18, 
1974. Specifically, the Affidavit in support of the Order to 
Show Cause signed by Mr. Sidney Gilbert indicated that the 
defendants had failed to raise the necessary monies and that 
they had failed to turn over any of the books or assets of the 
corporation and finally alleged that the defendants were in the 
process of taking the large equipment out of the State of Utah. 
(R.126-129). 
11. The Order to Show Cause came on for hearing on August 
1, 1975, and was continued to August 15, 1975 (R.151). The 
Order to Show Cause was continued again to October 10, 1975 
(R.152), and was finally stricken from the calendar, to be 
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called up on ten (10) days written notice by either party. 
(R.165). 
12. After the Order to Show Cause was stricken on October 
10, 1975, no action was taken in the case as it related to the 
plaintiffs and defendants until January 30, 1979. At that time, 
Dwight G. Flickinger became the defendants fourth counsel in the 
case. After the substitution took place on January 30, 1979, no 
action was taken until March 13, 1979, at which time counsel for 
the defendant, Mr. Flickinger, filed a Request for Pre-Trial 
Conference and Notice of Pre-Trial. (R.169-173). 
13. On March 19, 1979, the case came before the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock for Pre-Trial. During the course of the 
Pre-Trial, no trial date was set. (R.176). 
14. On May 16, 1979, a Stipulation for Dismissal of the 
Receivership was filed with the Court (R.177-179). The Order 
signed by Judge Bullock based upon Stipulation rescinded the 
confirmation and appointment of the receiver effective March 19, 
1979, and reserved the exoneration of the receiver as an issue 
in the case and further did not require the receiver to provide 
an accounting unless requested by the receiver himself or any of 
the other parties. The last portion of the Order signed by 
Judge Bullock then stated explicitly that the case was to be put 
on the inactive calendar until further notice (R.179). 
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15. No action was taken from the filing of that Order 
until M. Dayle Jeffs, counsel for the plaintiff withdrew from the 
case on June 18, 1984, inasmuch as his deposition had been 
noticed and it became apparent that he would be a material 
witness, (R.181-182). 
16• Defendants, appearing through their fifth counsel of 
record on June 20, 1984, noticed the depositions of eighteen 
different individuals (R.184-187), moved for a trial date 
(R.203-205), and sent to the plaintiffs a set of interrogatories 
containing two hundred separate interrogatories with sub-parts, 
(R.212-280). Additionally, defendants1 new counsel sent a 
Request for Production of Documents, consisting of thirty 
separate requests. (R.282-287). 
17. Judge J. Robert Bullock noticed the case for purpose 
of scheduling on August 3, 1984. The Court set the matter for a 
Scheduling Conference on August 24, 1984. (R.295). 
18. Plaintiffs, appearing through their counsel, Richard 
B. Johnson, who took the place of M. Dayle Jeffs filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the Counterclaim on the basis of Rule 41(b). Filed 
therewith was a supporting Memorandum (R.296-304). Additionally, 
plaintiffs moved the Court for a Protective Order to be relieved 
of the burden of the Depositions, Interrogatories and Request of 
7 
Documents on the basis they were clearly burdensome and sent 
with the intent to harass, (R.305-310). 
19. When the matter came on for scheduling on August 24, 
1984, the Court determined that the Motion to Dismiss the 
Counterclaim and also for Protective Order should be heard on an 
evidentiary basis. The Court ordered Mr. Summerhays to file a 
Response to the Motions within the week and both sides were to 
be prepared for a factual hearing on Thursday, September 20, 
1984. Defendants stipulated to a Protective Order as it related 
to the Discovery. (R.332). 
20. The matter, after extensive briefing by the plaintiffs, 
came on for evidentiary hearing on September 20, 1984. At that 
time, M. Dayle Jeffs and Sidney Gilbert were sworn and testified. 
The defendants called Ned R. Shelley and then both parties 
rested. Based upon the evidence, the Court ruled that under 
Rule 41(b), the action should be dismissed inasmuch as because 
of the lapse of time, it would be unreasonably difficult, if not 
impossible, for the plaintiffs to respond to the Counterclaim 
and prepare for trial because much of the evidence has been lost 
and memories have obviously been dimmed. The Court further 
found that the defendants had not been diligent to the extent 
required under all of the circumstances as shown by the record 
8 
and the evidence and finally, the Court found that the dismissal 
of the Counterclaim would not be unjust, (R.346-347), 
21. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, 
incorporating Judge Bullock's findings were prepared and signed 
by Judge Bullock on November 19, 1984, (R.348-353), 
22. Notice of Appeal was filed by the defendants on 
December 19, 1984. (R.356-357). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
23. Plaintiffs are entitled to a dismissal of the 
defendants' Counterclaim under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure inasmuch as the defendants failed to prosecute 
the case with diligence and failed to comply with the appropriate 
rules of the District Court and Rules of Civil Procedure. 
24. The case law interpreting Rule 41(b) and the responsi-
bility of litigants, fully supports Judge Bullock's Order 
dismissing the case. 
25. The fact that because of the large amount of time 
passing between the crucial facts giving rise to this litigation 
and the actual ^  time when the defendants pursued their 
Counterclaim, justify, in light of dim memories and lost records, 
the dismissal of the action. 
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POINT I 
THE RECORD AND EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE SUPPORT 
DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. 
Judge Bullock, in his Ruling at Trial, (R.346-347), in the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R.348-353) 
make three findings upon which he based the dismissal of the 
action. The Court found that because of the lapse of time, it 
would be unreasonably difficult, if not impossible, for the 
plaintiffs to respond to the Counterclaim and prepare for trial 
because much of the evidence had been lost and memories obviously 
have been dimmed. Secondly, the Court found that the defendants 
have not been diligent to the extent required under all the 
circumstances as shown by the record and the evidence in moving 
the case forward. Thirdly, the Court found that under all of 
the circumstances the Court believed the dismissal of the 
Counterclaim would not be unjust. All three aspects of that 
Ruling are fully supported by the record. 
A. The Defendants Have Not Been Diligent To The 
Extent Required Under All Of The Circum-
stances In Moving The Case Forward. 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, there was certainly 
some activity in the case from the time the Complaint was filed 
on March 26, 1974 to October 10, 1975. It was on October 10, 
1975, that the plaintiffs1 Order to Show Cause seeking to hold 
the defendants in contempt of court for failing to transfer 
10 
assets to the receiver and otherwise abide by the Court's Order 
was stricken, (R.165). 
The defendants took no action with regard to the prosecution 
of the Counterclaim or for the advancement of the case generally 
from October 10, 1975, until the defendants had retained Dwight 
G. Flickinger as their attorney who entered an appearance on 
January 22, 1979. (R.167). It took Mr. Flickinger from January 
22, 1979 to March 9, 1979 to request a Pre-Trial Conference. 
(R.171-172). From the time Mr. Flickinger entered his appearance 
in January to the time he requested a Pre-Trial, no discovery or 
activity took place in the file. It was only after the Notice 
of Pre-Trial that one of the plaintiffs, Bryce W. Baker, had his 
deposition taken. (R.174). 
As indicated above, the Pre-Trial was held on March 19, 
1979 (R.176) but the Stipulation dealing with how the case was 
going to progress was not filed until May 16, 1979. (R.177-179). 
Page three of that Stipulation and Order recites in the paragraph 
directly above Judge Bullock's signature the following: 
It is further ordered placing this case on 
the inactive calendar until further notice. 
(R.179) - (See full body of the Stipulation and Order set out in 
the Addendum.) 
In 1983, the Judicial Counsel of the State of Utah adopted 
amended Rules of Practice for the District Courts. One of those 
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Rules deals specifically with the timing of civil cases and 
specifically the time that a litigant can take to get a matter 
ready for trial. Rule 4.1(h) of the Rules of Practice of the 
District Courts, states as follows: 
The Clerk of the Court shall place on the 
inactive calendar every case in which a 
Certification of Readiness for Trial has not 
been served and filed within 270 days after 
service of process thereof. All cases 
remaining on the Inactive Calendar for two 
months shall be dismissed without prejudice 
for lack of prosecution and the Court shall 
make an appropriate order as to any bond or 
other security filed therein, unless prior 
to the expiration of such two month period: 
1) a proper Certification of Readiness for 
Trial is served and filed; or 
2) the Court, on motion for good cause 
shown, orders the case continued on the 
Inactive Calendar for a specified period of 
time without dismissal. 
After the Court signed the Order placing the case on the 
Inactive Calendar, which Order is dated May 16, 1979, absolutely 
no action was taken during the next two months and accordingly, 
under Rule 4.1(h), the Court certainly had the power to dismiss 
the action. 
At the time of the evidentiary hearing, only one witness 
testified from first-hand knowledge as to the reason why the 
case was placed on the Inactive Calendar and the length of time 
12 
contemplated by the Court and counsel that it would take to get 
the case to trial. 
Mr. Jeffs testified that he, on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
and Mr. Flickinger, on behalf of the defendants, discussed 
specifically what was contemplated by the clause which placed 
the case on the Inactive Calendar. (T.14, R.380). Mr. Jeffs 
testified that those conversations took place shortly before the 
preparation of the Stipulation and that the substance of the 
conversation was as follows: 
MR. JEFFS: It was conversation by telephone. 
He called me from Phoenix, I believe; and 
indicated that he wanted to get this 
receivership out of the way. We discussed 
how the receivership came about; and that 
after the receivership, after Mr. Gilbert 
was appointed, that the defendants removed 
all of the ditch lining; I forgot what their 
name is, its an invention of Mr. Shelleys, 
that they removed them all from the State of 
Utah and from the jurisdiction of Mr. 
Gilbert, and that the bank account had been 
removed, and he had not way to reach beyond 
state jurisdiction. 
He indicated to me, Mr. Flickinger indicated 
to me, that they had, I believe, already had 
some hearings in Washington D.C. with SBA or 
with the Senate Committees or something of 
that nature; that they were in negotiations 
with the SBA, he had requested a pre-trial 
conference in March; and rather than setting 
it on the trial calendar he suggested that 
if we stipulated the termination of the 
receivership as not having any useful 
purpose at that time, even though it had 
been stipulated to, that he would in a 
matter of two, three, four months have his 
13 
matters far enough along with the SBA that 
he would then gear it up and we would go 
forward with the Trial. 
(T.14-15, R.380-381). 
When Mr. Jeffs was asked explicitly as to whether or not 
there was any discussion that the case would even continue an 
inactive status for even a year Mr. Jeffs stated: 
Oh - No. He assured me that when he, he had 
either investigated the case thoroughly and 
that when he takes on a case when he said: 
fitfs going to move and its going to move 
fast' he said: 'we'll be in trial within 
less than a year.' 
(T.15-16, R.381-382). 
Mr. Flickinger, representing the defendants, thought that 
during that three or four month period of time, that he would be 
able to obtain a reinstatement of the SBA loan and get the 
approximately $144,000 of money which had not been disbursed 
under the original loan. (T.48, R.414). On cross-examination, 
Mr. Jeffs was asked if at the end of the three or four month 
period of time if he tried to make contact with Mr. Flickinger. 
Mr. Jeffs indicated that he did not and when asked why not, Mr. 
Jeffs testified as follows: 
I received a call, and I don't know the time 
frame, but I received a call from another 
attorney that said he was going to be 
representing the Shelleys. 
(T.51, R.417). 
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Mr. Jeffs indicated that during that period of time, he had 
at least four or five attorneys calling him at different times, 
indicating that they were licensed to practice in both Arizona 
and Utah, that they would be representing the Shelleys and the 
Shelley Irrigation Company and that they would make an appearance 
in the matter. (T.ll, R.377). 
Mr. Jeffs was asked on cross-examination explicitly whether 
or not any of the reasons given to the Court or Mr. Jeffs 
replacing the case on the Inactive Calendar was because of 
litigation in the Federal District Court initiated by the 
defendants against other parties. On each occasion, Mr. Jeffs 
indicated that although the federal lawsuit was a peripheral 
matter, that it did not play any part in the discussion relating 
to placing the present case on the inactive calendar. (T.47-50, 
R.413-416). 
From May 16, 1979, the date Judge Bullock signed the Order 
placing the case on the Inactive Calendar, no action was taken 
until Mr. Summerhays, present counsel for the defendants, 
entered an appearance and submitted to the plaintiffs the 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and the 
Notice of Depositions which were all filed approximately June 
18, 1984. Over five years had transpired with absolutely no 
activity in an action which sought to litigate facts occurring 
15 
prior to 1974. In review of the transcript of the hearing and 
the file of the case, there is little question that the 
defendants, while employing a large number of attorneys over a 
ten year period, failed to take any kind of reasonable action in 
prosecuting their case with diligence. 
B. The Long Lapse Of Time Would Make It 
Impossible For The Plaintiffs To Respond And 
Prepare For Trial On The Defendants' Counter-
claim. 
The Court in its Findings of Fact and Decision specifically 
found that evidence pertaining to the defendants' claims had 
been lost and that memories had been dimmed. The Court concluded 
it would be unreasonably difficult, if not impossible, for the 
plaintiffs to respond to the claims contained in the Counter-
claim. (See Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
in the Addendum). 
At the evidentiary hearing conducted on September 20, 1984, 
several witnesses testified regarding the ability to prepare for 
trial on the defendants' Counterclaim. 
Mr. Jeffs, attorney for the plaintiffs, testified that he 
had involvement with the defendants, Ned Shelley and Shelley 
Irrigation, prior to the initiation of the Complaint. He 
testified that there were a number of meetings relating to 
investments, stock purchases, and negotiations with SBA and 
Valley Bank. (T.5-6, R.371-372). Mr. Jeffs testified that there 
16 
were no notes that he was aware of that related to meetings with 
the SBA and Valley Bank which it occurred, at the time of the 
hearing, over eleven years ago. (T.6, R.372). Mr. Jeffs stated 
consistently that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, 
to remember the facts relative to the litigation and that his 
ability to remember was impeded by the long delay in the matter. 
(T.7, R.373). 
Mr. Jeffs was asked questions relating to the books and 
records available concerning the corporation from 1974 to the 
present date. Specifically, Mr. Jeffs was asked whether Mr. 
Gilbert, the stipulated receiver, ever received possession of 
the assets of the business or of its records, from which some 
documentation could be procured relating to the issues relevant 
in the lawsuit. Mr. Jeffs testified that Mr. Gilbert never 
received from the defendant Shelley, pursuant to the Stipulation 
for Receivership, any assets. The only thing the receiver ever 
obtained from Mr. Shelley was some of the records. (T.19, 
R.385) . 
Mr. Jeffs was then asked whether or not he had an opinion as 
to whether the presentation of the case would be prejudiced by 
the time element. Mr. Jeffs testified that it would be severely 
prejudiced (T.20, R.386). 
17 
Mr. Jeffs testified that after being contacted by the 
defendants new counsel in March of 1984, Mr. Jeffs attempted to 
contact some of the individuals whom he had represented ten 
years before. Mr. Jeffs stated that he could not locate all of 
them and was able to meet with less than a third of those who 
had originally been named as plaintiffs. Mr. Jeffs testified 
that some of the plaintiffs could not even remember that they 
were in the lawsuit, some could not even remember any details 
concerning the litigation, and as it related to the plaintiffs1 
memories as to specific meetings, many had hardly any memory at 
all of the critical dates. Mr. Jeffs concluded by saying that 
it was obvious that he had a better memory than the plaintiffs 
about the specific meetings but he had many gaps in his own 
recollection. (T.19-21, R.385-387). 
Mr. Jeffs was asked whether or not there were any tape 
recordings of meetings. Mr. Jeffs indicated that he had never 
heard or listened to any tape recordings (T.55, R.421). 
The plaintiffs called Mr. Sidney S. Gilbert who testified 
he was the certified public accountant and had been so for 
twenty-eight years. (T.62, R.428). Mr. Gilbert testified that 
he did not have any documents relating to the Shelley Irrigation 
matter. (T.62, R.428). When asked about his appointment, the 
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activities that he engaged in and the assets he took control of, 
Mr. Gilbert testified as follows: 
I was appointed by the Court. We eventually 
were able to get entrance into the office 
over in Lindon, and had access to that 
building. That was, those assets were the 
only assets I had any connection with. 
As far as the records were concerned, the 
only records I worked with, as far as 
receipts and disbursements, some checks were 
brought in, I had made out checks for 
payroll and, possibly, some expenses. And 
then, I believe Mrs. Shelley brought those 
in, and then I would make out a payroll for 
the people working on the machines and they 
were paid and the monies were disbursed to 
those people. 
(T.62-63, R.428-429). 
Mr. Gilbert indicated that he was involved in the business 
for a couple of months and inasmuch as the equipment was located 
out of the state he did not do anything after that time. (T.63, 
R. 429) . 
When asked whether or not he had an opinion as to whether 
his ability as a witness to comment upon what the receiver did 
in interfering with the company is diminished by the passage of 
time, Mr. Gilbert stated as follows: 
Well, I have no records left of what I did 
or what I didn't do; but, I didn't interfere 
with the company, to my knowledge, and I 
couldn't testify that I didn't. 
(T.64, R. 430). 
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Mr* Gilbert testified that his ability to comment on what 
took place after his appointment was diminished by the passage 
of time and that he does not remember with any accuracy 
conversations and contact that he had, Mr. Gilbert testified 
that he had totally forgotten about the case and had wiped it 
out his memory, (T.64-65, R.430-431). 
POINT II 
UTAH LAW SUPPORTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in 
pertinent pari: as follows: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
to comply with these rules or any order of 
the Court, defendant may move for dismissal 
of an action of any claim against him . . . . 
The Utah Supreme Court has examined the latitude a Trial 
Court has under Rule 41(b) on several prior occasions. In K. L. 
C. Inc., v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986 (Utah, 1982), a factual situa-
tion was presented much like the facts in the present action. 
The appeal was provoked by the granting of plaintiffs' Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute under Rule 41(b). A lawsuit 
was brought by a plaintiff corporation against the defendant who 
was previously the secretary-treasurer of the corporation. The 
defendant had apparently written an $8,000 check from corporate 
funds he allegedly has misappropriated. The corporation voted 
the defendant out of office and thereafter, Complaint was filed 
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against him to recover the amount of the check. Subsequently, 
the defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim, The case was 
set for trial on December 12, 1968. Defendants' local counsel 
withdrew in October, 1968, and new counsel appeared in November, 
1968 and the trial was moved to March, 1969. The trial was not 
held on the date set and for six years the case remained dormant. 
Suddenly, on November 26, 1975, a non-jury trial was set for 
March 19, 1976. That date was delayed for further discovery. 
From that point in time, the case remained dormant until March, 
1980 when new counsel requested a non-jury trial and later 
changed the request for a jury trial and the case was set for 
October 22, 1981. 
The plaintiff then moved to dismiss the Complaint under 
Rule 41(b) based upon the allegation that nothing significant 
had been done for years to move the case along. The Court, 
acting upon the plaintiffs' Motion, dismissed the case pursuant 
to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In supporting the Trial Court's Decision, the Supreme Court 
noted that Moorely, the plaintiffs' accountant who had custody 
of the books and records, had died sometime between the delivery 
and the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. It was also shown 
that the plaintiff had long since gone out of business and its 
officers had lost any hope of collecting on the defendants1 
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worthless check and the Court in summarizing the power of the 
District Court, stated as follows: 
Rule 41(b) sets no deadline for the moving 
party to act; indeed, the Court retains 
inherent power to dismiss an action for 
failure to prosecute pursuant to its own 
Motion• 
K. L. C.. Inc.. supra at 987. 
The Supreme Court ruled on the same issue in Wilson v. 
Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah, 1980). In that case, the original 
Complaint was filed on March 11, 1968. An Answer was filed on 
April 22, 1968 and nothing else transpired until April 26, 1973, 
at which time an Order issued from the Court setting the matter 
for trial on September 17, 1973. The trial was continued and no 
new date was set until May 4, 1977 when plaintiffs moved to 
vacate the trial date inasmuch as the sale of the property 
interest, which they had contracted to purchase, required 
approval from the Probate Court. The approval was finally 
obtained on May 16, 1977, immediately following which plaintiffs 
moved the Court to issue an Order substituting them as party 
plaintiffs in the action. On January 10, 1978, seven months 
later, and more than nine years after the original Petition to 
Review the Decision of the State Engineer had been filed, the 
trial court issued an Order to Show Cause why the matter should 
not be dismissed. Upon hearing of the matter, it was referred to 
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the trial calendar. On October 3, 1978, defendant was served 
with plaintiffs1 first Interrogatories, Two weeks thereafter, 
on October 16, 1978, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
failure to diligently prosecute the case. The trial court 
granted the Motion. 
In reviewing the Decision of Judge Burns in the Wilson 
case, the Supreme Court noted the great latitude and discretion 
given to the trial court with regard to the Rule. The Supreme 
Court stated: 
Pursuant to this Rule, it is held, in both 
state and federal practice, that the 
disposition of a Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Prosecute rests with the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and that a 
showing will not be upset absent a showing 
of abuse of that discretion [citing cases]. 
Wilson, supra at 767. 
In Westincrhouse Electric Supply v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975), the Court listed the 
elements to be considered by the trial court as follows: 
1) The conduct of both parties: 
2) The opportunity each had to move the 
case forward; 
3) What each of the parties had done to move the 
case forward; 
4) What difficulty or prejudice may have 
been caused the other side; 
5) And, most important, whether injustice 
may result from the dismissal. 
23 
See also Polk v. Ivers. 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977); Utah Oil 
Company v. Harris, 565 P. 2d 1135 (Utah 1977); Grundman v. 
Williams and Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984). 
It is respectfully submitted that the law in this state 
interpreting Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
wide latitude to the trial judge. When one examines the facts 
of this case, there is simply no excuse under the criteria set 
by this Court to require plaintiffs, after more than ten (10) 
years of litigation to try a case where all the records, 
memories, crucial elements in a presentation of a case have been 
lost or severely diminished. 
In the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the defendants 
failed to put on any kind of evidence, showing that a common 
thread of records and documents had been kept to allow either 
party to prosecute the case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court acted 
properly in dismissing the case and that it is in the best 
interest of justice that neither party be put to the burden of 
litigating the case. It was for the purpose of avoiding the 
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injustice presented in this case that Rule 41(b) has been 
employed by the courts. 
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